During your section on Epiphenomenalism you mention that from this perspective mental states are to physical states what seafoam is the ocean waves; the seafoam is caused by the behavior of the ocean waves, but the behavior of the seafoam does not impact the ocean waves. Could it not be the case that mental states are causally efficacious to other mental states and not to physical states while physical states are causally efficacious to physical states and mental states?
Yes. On this view, mental states are causally determined by preceding mental states and physical brain states. But the objections to epiphenomenalism arise from the claim that mental states are noy physically causally efficacious.
This is an interesting objection. So there’s three options. (1) my pain-feeling causes my belief-feeling, (2) some physical process causes my belief-feeling, or (3) both my pain-feeling and a physical process cause my belief-feeling.
(1) is implausible. To see this, imagine that mental states are only caused by other mental states. If this were true, then it’s hard to explain why mental states tend to correlate with physical states (eg drinking alcohol causes you to feel drunk). So if it’s not the case in general that mental states are the only cause of other mental states, then it’s on you to explain why belief is an exception.
If (2), then we get the “knowledge” objection you’re trying to avoid.
(3) is the most interesting case. I think to fully address it, you need to work out your views on overdetermination (an event having multiple causes). I haven’t done that yet, so I need to think more before answering fully.
Mind is nothing more or less than a metaphor for the patterns in the brain. There is no mechanism or substance that allows otherwise.
During your section on Epiphenomenalism you mention that from this perspective mental states are to physical states what seafoam is the ocean waves; the seafoam is caused by the behavior of the ocean waves, but the behavior of the seafoam does not impact the ocean waves. Could it not be the case that mental states are causally efficacious to other mental states and not to physical states while physical states are causally efficacious to physical states and mental states?
Yes. On this view, mental states are causally determined by preceding mental states and physical brain states. But the objections to epiphenomenalism arise from the claim that mental states are noy physically causally efficacious.
This is an interesting objection. So there’s three options. (1) my pain-feeling causes my belief-feeling, (2) some physical process causes my belief-feeling, or (3) both my pain-feeling and a physical process cause my belief-feeling.
(1) is implausible. To see this, imagine that mental states are only caused by other mental states. If this were true, then it’s hard to explain why mental states tend to correlate with physical states (eg drinking alcohol causes you to feel drunk). So if it’s not the case in general that mental states are the only cause of other mental states, then it’s on you to explain why belief is an exception.
If (2), then we get the “knowledge” objection you’re trying to avoid.
(3) is the most interesting case. I think to fully address it, you need to work out your views on overdetermination (an event having multiple causes). I haven’t done that yet, so I need to think more before answering fully.